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The demand for collateral in wholesale ﬁ  nancial  • 
markets has increased along with ﬁ  nancial activity 
worldwide.
Collateral is used to mitigate credit risk between  • 
the counterparties involved in a ﬁ  nancial trans-
action by providing insurance that the lender will 
be repaid.
Secondary-market liquidity has an important  • 
effect on the choices of collateral. Relatively less 
liquid securities that have fewer alternative uses 
are more likely to be pledged, while assets in 
which an institution plays a larger market-making 
role are also typically pledged.
T
o mitigate credit risk, collateral is required of 
ﬁ  nancial institutions (FIs) operating in securities 
trading and derivatives markets, as well as in 
central bank operations and large-value payment and 
settlement systems. Assets eligible as collateral are 
usually liquid, with negligible levels of credit risk, such 
as government or government-guaranteed securities. 
As the demand for collateral has increased, the list 
of securities deemed eligible as collateral has grown 
to include private sector securities that meet certain 
credit-rating requirements. Still, there is a concern that 
new demands will outstrip the growth in the supply of 
these preferred assets and that the costs to acquire 
and hold these assets will increase over time (Com-
mittee on the Global Financial System 2001).
1
This article examines the incentives for banks to hold 
various assets on their balance sheets for use as 
collateral when the opportunity costs of doing so are 
high. It focuses on the ﬁ  ve-year period between 
mid-2002 and mid-2007 that preceded the worldwide 
ﬁ  nancial crisis in order to determine a baseline for 
collateral-management practices, and in particular, 
the factors affecting the choice of security during 
relatively normal times. Speciﬁ  cally, the article exam-
ines the choices made by FIs among the assets that 
serve as collateral in Canada’s Large Value Transfer 
System (LVTS). By the end of March 2007, FIs had 
pledged collateral with a market value of $32 billion. 
Given the large value of the assets tied up as collat-
eral, it is important that FIs establish robust controls, 
determine sources of additional collateral, and ensure 
that the assets are managed effectively with respect 
to both liquidity and their balance sheets. The 
adequacy of liquidity management by FIs is also of 
concern to policy-makers,
2 as illustrated by the fact 
1  New demand has come about mostly via increased growth in derivatives markets and 
in payment and settlement system activity.
2  The risks of a bank becoming insolvent as a result of problems associated with funding 
illiquidity are explored in Goodhart (2008). See also Armstrong and Caldwell (2008) and 
Banque de France (2008).
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the LVTS
Collateral is used to mitigate credit risk between the 
counterparties in a ﬁ  nancial transaction. In particular, 
the credit risk of the borrower is offset by the insur-
ance provided by the value of the asset pledged as 
collateral. Collateralization is a widespread technique 
which ensures that disparities between market 
participants, at least in terms of credit risk, effectively 
cease to exist.
5 From the borrower’s perspective, the 
risk-reducing effect implies more favourable ﬁ  nancing 
conditions and broader or deeper access to markets. 
FIs hold liquid assets both to meet their expected 
business needs for collateral and to mitigate the risk 
that they may not be able to meet unexpected cash 
ﬂ  ows without affecting their daily operations. These 
securities may be easily redeployed across business 
lines when the need arises. Recent volatility in the 
wholesale funding markets has highlighted the 
importance of sound liquidity risk-management 
practices, since FIs can experience liquidity problems 
even during good economic times.
6
While liquid assets are an important resource for 
banks operating in wholesale ﬁ  nancial markets, they 
have a relatively high opportunity cost, diverting funds 
from lending operations that generate higher returns. 
Depending on the nature of the incentives, collateral 
managers may therefore hold pools of excess collat-
eral against the possibility that collateral will become 
expensive when it is needed. Overall, to manage 
liquidity risk efﬁ  ciently, ﬁ  rms must minimize funding 
costs, diversify funding, and monitor the operational 
risks associated with moving funds and collateral.
The LVTS is a real-time, electronic wire transfer 
system that processes large-value, time-critical 
payments quickly and continuously throughout the 
day. Participants in the LVTS use claims on the Bank 
of Canada to settle net payment obligations. To 
secure the payments that are sent through the LVTS, 
collateral is required.
7 While a large buffer of collateral 
can be held for precautionary reasons, this strategy 
increases the opportunity cost to FIs that would rather 
5  In extreme situations, however, when bankruptcy is perceived to be imminent, there 
have been examples of institutions not being able to borrow on even a collateralized 
basis.
6  Decker (2000); Diamond and Rajan (2001); and Strahan, Gatev, and Schuermann 
(2004) discuss liquidity-risk management, and how banks have evolved new 
techniques to mitigate credit risk. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) recognize 
that the balance-sheet liquidity of traders is limited because of such constraints as 
collateral and margin requirements imposed by counterparties.
7  See Arjani and McVanel (2006) for a complete description of the LVTS.
that the ﬁ  nancial crisis that began in 2007 has 
prompted central banks around the world to expand 
the lists of assets they would accept as collateral to 
support the efﬁ  cient functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets.
3
In addition to improving our understanding of collat-
eral and liquidity-risk management practices within 
and across FIs, this article seeks to contribute to 
the market-microstructure literature in ﬁ  xed-income 
markets. It examines how secondary-market liquidity 
and the market-making capacity of FIs affect the 
types of assets pledged as collateral in the LVTS. 
Many FIs that employ collateral in their wholesale 
operations are also dealers in ﬁ  xed-income markets 
and have a comparative advantage in managing 
inventories of these assets. These dealers provide 
liquidity to their customers and other dealers by 
buying and selling securities at their posted quotes.
4 
When collateral is required in a timely manner, market-
making institutions can look to their inventories of 
eligible assets for use as collateral. While there is a 
signiﬁ  cant literature on the market microstructure 
of securities that are typically used as collateral, few 
studies have empirically examined the actual cost, 
or pricing, of ﬁ  nancial collateral.
Many FIs that employ collateral in their 
wholesale operations are also dealers 
in ﬁ  xed-income markets and have a 
comparative advantage in managing 
inventories of these assets.
The article begins with a brief discussion of recent 
trends in collateral management and the requirements 
for collateral in Canada’s LVTS. This is followed by a 
short discussion of the data employed in the study, 
the factors that affect the cost of collateral, and the 
methodology used to determine how FIs decide which 
assets to pledge as collateral, and for how long. The 
results section provides evidence that the relative 
scarcity of collateral is important in the decision-
making process. The article concludes with a sum-
mary of the ﬁ  ndings.
3  For example, on 12 December 2007, the Bank of Canada expanded the list of eligible 
securities that could be pledged as collateral in its Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF) to 
include certain types of asset-backed commercial paper and U.S. Treasuries. Then, on 
17 October 2008, the Bank announced the temporary acceptance of non-mortgage 
loan portfolios. The SLF provides collateralized overnight loans to FIs without sufﬁ  cient 
settlement balances at the Bank to permit the settlement of multilateral net positions in 
the LVTS.
4  Trade in ﬁ  xed-income markets is organized in a multiple-dealer, over-the-counter 
market. See Fleming and Remolona (1999) and D’Souza and Gaa (2004).
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Information about the movement of assets into and 
out of LVTS collateral pools is derived from daily 
snapshots. The following information was collected 
for each security pledged as collateral on each day 
over the sample period (28 March 2002 to 30 March 
2007):
10 the LVTS participant, security identiﬁ er, issuer 
name, par value, discounted value, coupon, and 
maturity date.
11 In total, 14 FIs act as participants in 
the LVTS and pledge collateral for the purpose of 
making payments. For this study, securities are 
grouped in ﬁ ve general categories: longer-term GoC 
bonds, short-term GoC treasury bills, GoC guaranteed 
securities, provincial and municipal securities, and 
private sector securities (such as bankers’ accept-
ances, promissory notes, commercial paper, and 
corporate bonds). 
Table 1 provides statistics on the pool of securities 
pledged in the LVTS at the beginning and end of the 
sample period. The number of securities and the value 
of collateral across all FIs in each asset class are 
presented in columns 2 and 6, and columns 3 and 7, 
respectively. The total discounted value of collateral 
increased from about $20 billion to $32 billion between 
2002 and 2007. This is consistent with the overall 
increase in payment ﬂ ows over the same period. It 
also illustrates the need for FIs to manage their 
collateral more effectively. 
Columns 4 and 8 in Table 1 indicate the percentage of 
collateral associated with each asset class. While the 
total discounted value (columns 3 and 7) of GoC 
bonds and treasury bills is similar at the beginning 
and end of the sample period, the share of treasury 
bills within that total has increased substantially. Note 
that FIs are pledging more and more securities from 
assets that were made eligible in November 2001 
(such as provincial/municipal and private sector secur-
ities). Lastly, average maturities (in months), shown in 
columns 5 and 9, have increased signiﬁ cantly for GoC- 
guaranteed, provincial, municipal, and private sector 
securities, while the overall average has declined, 
largely because of the increasing reliance on treasury 
bills.
As noted above, there has been an overall increase 
in payment ﬂ ows during the sample period. Chart 1 
illustrates the large increase in quarterly payment 
10 These dates were chosen to control for seasonal factors and to provide enough time for 
FIs to adjust to changes in collateral policies introduced in November 2001.
11 There were more than 100 different issuers of securities over the sample period.
hold higher-yielding assets.
8 FIs must choose a set 
of assets that balances the forgone higher returns 
with the collateral services provided by the assets. 
The optimal asset portfolio that minimizes the oppor-
tunity cost of collateral will depend not only on overall 
business needs, but also on ﬁ nancial market factors.
The optimal asset portfolio that 
minimizes the opportunity cost of 
collateral will depend not only on 
overall business needs, but also on 
ﬁ nancial market factors.
The Bank of Canada has established a list of secur-
ities for the pledging of collateral within the LVTS (see 
below for the detailed list of collateral groupings used 
in this study). In general, collateral must be liquid, of 
acceptable credit quality, and have a transparent 
market for valuation.
9 The Bank originally accepted 
only Government of Canada (GoC) securities as collat-
eral, but since it expanded the list in November 2001 
to include a larger variety of securities (e.g., municipal 
securities and commercial paper), pools of collateral 
pledged by individual FIs to the LVTS have diversiﬁ ed 
signiﬁ cantly. Thus, while GoC-issued securities 
constituted about 55 per cent of the discounted value 
of securities pledged in 2002, they made up less than 
30 per cent in early 2007 (Table 1). The value of private 
sector securities plus provincial and municipal secur-
ities jumped from about 12 per cent to more than 
40 per cent over the same period. 
These statistics suggest that FIs are clearly ﬁ nding 
alternative securities to pledge as collateral in the 
LVTS and are selling or reallocating expensive and 
scarce government-issued securities. Other factors 
speciﬁ c to ﬁ nancial markets and institutions (e.g., 
market interest rates, capital-asset ratios, and pay-
ment ﬂ ows) also drive the choice of newly pledged 
collateral, as well as the average length of time before 
that asset is removed from the LVTS pool. 
8 Payments sent and received by each institution can vary signiﬁ cantly within and across 
days, depending on customer needs. McPhail and Vakos (2003) illustrate how a buffer 
of collateral is typically employed to accommodate unexpected incoming and outgoing 
ﬂ ows of funds.
9 Bindseil and Papadia (2006) discuss the acceptable risk characteristics of collateral. 
Securities currently eligible as collateral and their margin are available at
<http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/ﬁ nancial/securities.pdf>.
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securities. Columns 3 and 6 are surprisingly similar and 
may suggest that FIs typically pledge and then release, 
or release and then pledge, very similar securities. 
Over the ﬁ  ve-year period, almost two-thirds of the 
discounted value related to movements in collateral 
was associated with GoC bonds and bills. These 
securities are typically involved in repo market oper-
ations, have low credit risk, and are very liquid. While 
GoC securities are highly mobile in the LVTS, it is 
important to note that other security classes are also 
pledged and released on a frequent basis.
Several factors are hypothesized as to which assets 
are pledged as collateral. While various aspects are 
common across FIs, such as market liquidity in each 
asset class, others are speciﬁ  c to the business 
volumes sent by all direct participants in the LVTS.
12 
Only Tranche 1 payment volumes are shown because, 
despite being a small portion of overall volumes, most 
of the collateral pledged is actually in support of this 
type of payment.
13 Also shown is total collateral 
pledged, which illustrates strong growth, especially 
since mid-2005.
Table 2 is organized much like Table 1 and provides 
information about the movements of collateral—
securities pledged and released from the LVTS—over 
the sample period. Column 2 indicates the average 
holding period (i.e., the number of business days a 
security is pledged) for assets in each class. Lower-
risk securities (GoC bonds and guaranteed securities) 
are held as collateral in the LVTS for six days or less, 
while private sector securities are kept in the pool for 
more than 26 business days, on average. This may 
reﬂ  ect the value that FIs place on GoC (issued and 
guaranteed) bonds for other uses and the fact that 
private sector securities are less liquid and tend to be 
held longer in inventory. 
In columns 3 and 6, the number of securities either 
newly pledged to, or newly released from, the LVTS is 
documented across the ﬁ  ve asset classes. Columns 4 
and 7 reﬂ  ect the average value (in millions of dollars) 
of the transferred securities, while columns 5 and 8 
12  The overall change across the sample period reﬂ  ects an increase in the size of the 
economy, the migration of payments from the Automated Clearing Settlement System 
to the LVTS, payments settled through the Continuous Linked Settlement system and 
CDSX (operated by the Canadian Depository for Securities Limited), and increased 
GoC transactions. Figures on aggregate payment ﬂ  ows and ﬂ  ows disaggregated by 
participant are obtained from the Canadian Payments Association.
13  Tranche 1 payments that are sent can be no greater than the amount of collateral that 
the institution has pledged to the Bank of Canada. Under Tranche 2, each FI pledges to 
the Bank of Canada collateral equal to the largest bilateral line of credit it has extended 
to any other institution multiplied by a speciﬁ  ed percentage. Tranche 2 payments 
constitute most of the volume and value of payment transfers in the LVTS, principally 
because of savings in collateral relative to Tranche 1 operations.
Chart 1:  LVTS quarterly volumes, 2002Q2–07Q1a
Aggregate Tranche 1 payments sent by all direct participants in the Large Value Transfer  a. 
System (LVTS)
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quarter (right axis)
Table 1: LVTS collateral holdings by asset class
28 March 2002 30 March 2007
Assets
(#)





Total discounted value Average 
maturity
(months) Asset class ($ billions) (%) ($ billions) (%)
GoC bonds 27 9.55 47.64 83.07 24 2.45 7.67 100.50
GoC treasury bills 22 1.63 8.11 6.82 27 6.72 20.99 4.78
GoC-guaranteed securities 54 6.48 32.34 23.06 60 9.31 29.09 33.28
Provincial/municipal securities 11 0.42 2.10 42.73 102 7.63 23.84 68.83
Private sector securities 79 1.96 9.79 4.01 177 5.89 18.40 11.03
Total/average 193 20.03 100.00 48.88 390 32.00 100.0 36.83
Note: Government of Canada (GoC) bonds include all securities with maturities greater than one year. National Housing Act (NHA) Mortgage-Backed Securities are included with 
GoC-guaranteed securities. Private sector securities include bankers’ acceptances, promissory notes, commercial paper, and corporate bonds.
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advantage in managing. A proxy for relative market-
making capacity in each asset class is calculated as 
the ratio of trading relative to total trading by each 
institution. 
Payment ﬂ  ows, and their volatility, will effectively 
determine the total size of every collateral pool 
pledged by each participant in the LVTS. For ﬁ  rms 
that manage their LVTS payments intensively, the more 
payments that are received relative to those that must 
be sent, the less collateral will be required. When 
payment ﬂ  ows are large or volatile, FIs may need to 
purchase and pledge increasingly costly securities. 
Furthermore, since time-sensitive payments can be 
signiﬁ  cant, FIs may hold or borrow securities that are 
operations of the individual ﬁ  rm. The factors con-
sidered include asset market turnover, market-making 
capacity, payment ﬂ  ows, capital-asset ratio, and the 
collateralized overnight lending rate. We consider 
each in turn.
Turnover, a broad measure of market liquidity, is often 
associated with greater market depth. Eligible secur-
ities that are also liquid provide additional value to 
collateral managers, since such securities are rela-
tively easy to acquire or sell, with minimal impact on 
prices. For regular collateral requirements in the 
LVTS, managers will look ﬁ  rst to less-liquid assets 
and attempt to preserve any valuable collateral for 
other uses (e.g., trading in repo or derivatives mar-
kets). Turnover in each asset class, which provides an 
overall daily measure of the relative scarcity of a 
security, is calculated by dividing the volume of 
securities traded over a given period by the average 
amount of securities outstanding over the same 
period.
14
Chart 2 illustrates aggregate trading for all dealers in 
each asset class relative to trading in GoC bonds. The 
normalization is introduced to control for the overall 
increase in trading across markets and also to effect-
ively illustrate the size of the GoC bond market. While 
ratios are relatively stable across time in most asset 
classes, there has been a considerable increase in 
relative market activity in GoC-guaranteed securities. 
The market-making capacity of each FI in each asset 
class may also affect which securities an institution 
pledges in the LVTS, since banks may not want to use 
14  Outstanding amounts in each security class are collected from the Bank of Canada’s 
Banking and Financial Statistics. Data on each FI’s share of trading in each asset class 
were obtained from the Investment Dealers Association of Canada. 
Chart 2:  Aggregate trading as a share of GoC bond 
trading, 2002Q2–07Q1
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GoC bonds 6.0 4,190 228 123.5 4,096 196 120.5
GoC treasury bills 14.3 2,410 239 5.2 2,173 193 4.6
GoC-guaranteed securities 4 . 89 , 4 0 31 2 52 6 . 48 , 5 3 31 1 32 6 . 4
Provincial/municipal securities 14.7 3,547 91 92.8 3,223 80 91.3
Private sector securities 26.4 4,168 29 5.8 4,093 28 5.5
Total/average 11.2 23,718 133 47.7 22,118 116 47.3
Note: Government of Canada (GoC) bonds include all securities with maturities greater than one year. National Housing Act (NHA) Mortgage-Backed Securities are included with GoC 
guaranteed securities. Private sector securities include bankers’ acceptances, promissory notes, commercial paper, and corporate bonds. The Total/average row includes the sum of the 
pledges/releases for each asset type (columns 3 and 6) and the weighted average for the holding period, discounted value, and maturity columns.
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elements may affect the opportunity cost of every 
security that is eligible as collateral in the LVTS. An 
unordered conditional logit model is appropriate 
under these circumstances.
17 
The data set collected and analyzed for this study is 
atypical, since it includes mixtures of both individual 
and choice-speciﬁ  c attributes. These data are used to 
estimate a model of how FIs choose which security to 
pledge as collateral in the LVTS. The outcome is an 
estimate of the probability of pledging a particular type 
of asset given a set of control variables for individual 
ﬁ  rm characteristics as well as market-wide factors. 
The dependent variable in the model assumes a value 
of one when that asset is pledged, and zero other-
wise. Each observation is actually a set of data 
consisting of explanatory variables for the securities 
that were chosen as well as for those that were not 
chosen. To observe how individual ﬁ  rm characteristics 
(i.e., size, composition of assets, funding choices, 
regional diversiﬁ  cation, etc.) inﬂ  uence the choice of 
security, a dummy variable for each type of security is 
multiplied by each of the ﬁ  rm-level control variables: 
daily payments sent by the ﬁ  rm; the realized volatility 
of the FI’s payments over the past month; the liquid-
asset-to-total-asset ratio and the capital-to-asset ratio 
in the most recent quarter; and the overnight rate. 
Because a dummy is not included for GoC bonds, the 
resulting coefﬁ  cients are interpreted as the effect of 
the control variable on the probability of pledging the 
particular asset relative to GoC bonds. Variables are 
also included to control for general market liquidity 
and the market-making efforts of individual ﬁ  rms.
We also perform an analysis of pledging duration by 
estimating an accelerated failure-time model (estimat-
ing the probability that a certain security will be 
removed from the pool of pledged collateral) to 
determine whether the factors that drive choice also 
affect the length of time that an asset is pledged. 
Consider the following model of an accelerated 
“release” time: 
   (1)
where the release time of collateral is  , and   is an 
error term. The values of the explanatory variables,  , 
are chosen at the time the collateral is ﬁ  rst pledged to 
the LVTS. 
17  Estimation of a conditional logit model (clogit) is discussed in the box on page 14. See 
McFadden (1974) or, for a brief introduction, Greene (2008). A model speciﬁ  cation 
similar to that of Hensher (1986) is used in this article.
available in large amounts, such as government 
securities.
Liquid assets have a lower credit risk and are readily 
redeployable across business lines if the need arises. 
Banks that hold large pools of eligible and liquid 
assets on their balance sheets may pledge these 
assets to the LVTS. The percentage of liquid assets 
relative to total assets is a proxy for the relative size of 
an FI’s portfolio of liquid assets, as well as the scarcity 
of available liquid assets on its balance sheet. The 
capital-to-asset ratio of each FI, which measures the 
overall risk of a bank’s asset portfolio, may also affect 
which assets are pledged to the LVTS. A bank with a 
lower capital-asset ratio, for example, may have higher 
insolvency risks and ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to borrow from 
other banks on an uncollateralized basis.
15 Such an FI 
will preserve its most liquid assets in case of a funding 
shock.
Lastly, the overnight collateralized lending rate will 
also affect which assets are pledged in the LVTS. 
When collateral is scarce, the Canadian Overnight 
Repo Rate Average (CORRA) may fall relative to the 
Bank of Canada’s target for the overnight rate.
16 The 
CORRA is limited to repo transactions that involve 
general collateral and provides a transparent daily 
measure of the level of the overnight rate. Since the 
repo market is a very liquid market for the purchase 
and resale of GoC securities, FIs may tap this market 
for short-term collateral demands. When scarcity is an 
issue, however, FIs will economize on their collateral 
demands.
Methodology
Standard regression models are not appropriate when 
examining the choice of collateral made by banks. 
This choice is discrete, taking on only one of a number 
of values. Binary dependent models (such as logit and 
probit models), where the choice variable takes on 
only one of two values, are also not appropriate when 
ﬁ  rms are given many different choices. In the case of 
collateral choice, no natural ordering of assets exists 
across time and institutions. Instead, the ordering of 
securities will depend on each FI’s needs for payment 
services, its market-making capacity, conditions in the 
marketplace, and the state of the FI’s balance sheet at 
15  Liquid assets relative to total assets and the capital relative to risk-weighted asset 
ratios are obtained from quarterly balance sheet data from the Ofﬁ  ce of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions. Liquid assets include bank notes, deposits 
with the Bank of Canada, securities issued or guaranteed by the Government of 
Canada, and securities issued or guaranteed by provinces or municipalities. 
16  See Reid (2007). The Bank of Canada publishes the CORRA, which consists of a 
weighted average of rates on repo transactions conducted onscreen between 06:00 
and 16:00 hours and subsequently reported by interdealer brokers. 
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Only data corresponding to the largest ﬁ  nancial 
institutions in Canada are employed in the analysis. 
This reﬂ  ects our focus on market liquidity and market-
making, as well as the availability of trading data for a 
select number of ﬁ  rms. (The big six banks examined 
are the Bank of Montreal, the Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commerce, the Banque Nationale, the Royal Bank 
of Canada, Scotiabank, and the Toronto-Dominion 
Bank.) Furthermore, to simplify the model and pre-
serve the conﬁ  dentiality of the data, we assume that 
the effects of all independent variables are the same 
for each FI. The data are thus entered individually for 
each FI, but are pooled into one model.
18 Table 3 
presents coefﬁ  cient estimates, and their associated 
p-values, for all variables. Pseudo R  2 values indicate 
that the model provides a reasonably good ﬁ  t for the 
data.
Dummy variables for GoC treasury bills, GoC-
guaranteed securities, provincial and municipal 
securities, and private sector securities are included in 
the analysis, with GoC bonds treated as the control 
asset class. Positive (or negative) estimates indicate a 
greater (or smaller) likelihood that a security in a certain 
asset class will be pledged relative to a GoC bond. 
These dummies give an indication of any unobserved 
factors driving pledges unrelated to the control 
variables. Judging by the signs of the estimates, 
GoC-guaranteed securities are more likely, on 
average, to be pledged than GoC bonds, while 
GoC bills and private sector and provincial securities 
are less likely to be pledged. 
Control variables are included to reﬂ  ect factors that 
are thought to affect the management of collateral but 
are unrelated to ﬁ  nancial market liquidity and market-
making capacity. These controls are multiplied by the 
four dummy variables representing the individual asset 
classes. A positive estimate indicates an increased 
likelihood that a speciﬁ  c security type will be pledged 
relative to a GoC bond when that control variable 
increases. For example, when the value of payments 
sent increases on a particular day, GoC bonds are 
preferred to all other security classes (that is, all 
coefﬁ  cients are negative) to satisfy the increased 
collateral requirement. Intuitively, when collateral is 
needed for a short time, an FI can either expend effort 
looking for cheap securities, or (although this is 
18  While seasonal (e.g., quarterly) dummies may be warranted, only variables that differ 
across choices, or that differ across ﬁ  rm characteristics, can be included in the 
analysis. It is therefore not possible to control for changes in the behaviour of FIs 
across time.
Table 3: Conditional logit estimation of pledgesa
Explanatory variables Coefﬁ  cient
GoC bills   -1.011  (0.000)
GoC-guaranteed securities  0.807  (0.000)
Provincial/municipal securities  -1.200  (0.000)






 -0.395  (0.086)
 -6.306  (0.000)
 -1.536  (0.000)






 -2.933  (0.064)
 6.915  (0.000)
 3.246  (0.015)






 11.673  (0.000)
 30.463  (0.000)
 8.798  (0.000)






 -0.989  (0.000)
 -1.941  (0.000)
 -0.716  (0.000)






 3.674  (0.062)
 7.084  (0.000)
 -1.453  (0.358)
 1.746  (0.272)
Market liquidity  -3.571  (0.000)
Market-making  1.201  (0.000)
Observations 11189
Pseudo R 2 0.392
Wald statistic p-value 0.000
Estimates of coefﬁ  cients are based on the estimation of a conditional logit model. The  a. 
sample period is 28 March 2002 to 30 March 2007. Probability values are presented 
in parentheses. The dependent variable is equal to one for the asset class chosen 
and zero otherwise. Independent variables include dummy variables for GoC treasury 
bills, GoC-guaranteed securities, provincial/municipal securities, and private sector 
securities. These dummy variables are also multiplied by the value of payments 
sent on the day of the pledge, payment volatility (equal to the standard deviation 
of payments sent over the past 20 business days), the ratio of liquid to total assets 
in the most recent quarter, the ratio of capital to risk-weighted asset in the most 
recent quarter, and the spread between the CORRA and the Bank of Canada’s target 
overnight rate. Coefﬁ  cient estimates associated with payments sent and payment 
volatilities are multiplied by 10-4. The following are also included as explanatory 
variables: market liquidity, calculated by dividing the volume of securities traded 
over the most recent quarter by the average amount of securities outstanding in 
that quarter; and market-making, the fraction of trading in each asset class by each 
ﬁ  nancial institution. 
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endogenously.
Our main interest is the effect of market liquidity and 
a bank’s market-making capacity on the choice of 
assets pledged as collateral. Results presented in 
Table 3 are statistically signiﬁ  cant for both variables. 
Increased market liquidity in an asset class (which is 
measured by turnover) reduces the likelihood that a 
security from that sector of the ﬁ  xed-income market 
will be pledged. Intuitively, highly liquid securities are 
too valuable to serve as collateral from the perspec-
tive of a bank’s trading desk. While liquid assets could 
be released from the LVTS if the need arose, the 
operational costs of doing so may not be justiﬁ  ed. 
Alternatively, FIs are more likely to choose assets in 
which they have a greater market-making capacity 
(represented by relative trading activity). Banks that 
deal actively in a certain segment of the ﬁ  xed-income 
market have more expertise in managing inventories 
in that market. While institutions may be reluctant to 
pledge as collateral securities from their market-making 
portfolio of assets, they may be able to do this more 
efﬁ  ciently in a market in which they are better aware of 
the trading activity over time.
The results of the duration analysis (where the model 
looks at the amount of time a security remains pledged) 
performed with the same set of data are consistent 
with the results of the unordered conditional logit 
model. Models are estimated separately for each 
asset class.
19 Instead of examining the choice of 
security made by an FI pledging collateral to the 
LVTS, coefﬁ cient estimates in Table 4 show whether 
the length of time a security stays in the LVTS collat-
eral pool increases or decreases when the independent 
variables increase in magnitude. 
Results in Table 4 suggest that, across most asset 
classes, market liquidity reduces the time before a 
security is released from the LVTS, while market-
making capacity increases the length of time a 
security stays in the LVTS collateral pool. The only 
exception is GoC-guaranteed securities, where the 
results are reversed. Market liquidity increases the 
length of time that the security is pledged to the LVTS, 
while market-making intensity reduces the duration 
of the security’s stay in the LVTS. An interesting line of 
future research will be to investigate what aspect of 
GoC-guaranteed securities drives this result.
19  The random variable ( ) in equation 1 is assumed to follow a Weibull distribution, 
although results are robust to alternative probability distributions.
generally more costly) it can pledge an easily found 
GoC bond, recognizing that the bond will also be 
easier to sell once the collateral is no longer needed. 
In contrast, when the recent volatility of payments 
increases, all asset classes except GoC bills are more 
likely to be pledged relative to GoC bonds. This is 
especially true for private sector securities. This 
increased likelihood may reﬂ  ect the precautionary 
motive for holding collateral and the conservative 
nature of collateral managers. When volatility is high 
and persistent, they increase the buffer of cheap 
collateral pledged in the LVTS.
Comparing liquid assets with total assets gives some 
indication of the relative scarcity of liquid assets in 
each institution. Results suggest that a larger liquid-
asset ratio increases the probability that, relative to 
GoC bonds, an FI will pledge treasury bills, GoC-
guaranteed securities, or provincial and municipal 
bonds. The use of other liquid assets may be 
relatively high because FIs are employing GoC bonds 
elsewhere. 
A larger liquid-asset ratio increases the 
probability that, relative to GoC bonds, 
an FI will pledge treasury bills, GoC-
guaranteed securities, or provincial and 
municipal bonds.
The estimates also indicate that when the total 
capital-to-asset ratio decreases, banks are less likely 
to pledge GoC bonds relative to all other asset 
classes (similar results were found using the Basel 
Tier 1 capital-to-asset ratio). A reduction in the 
capital-asset ratio may indicate an increased risk of 
insolvency. FIs in this position will conserve their 
most-liquid assets (e.g., GoC bonds), which are 
acceptable as collateral by a wider range of parties in 
the marketplace if additional funding is required. 
A decrease in the overnight rate relative to the Bank of 
Canada’s overnight target might suggest that high-
quality collateral has become scarcer (e.g., securities 
in high demand will trade at a lower rate in the repo 
market. Participants who own such securities can 
lend them in the repo market in return for cash, at a 
lower interest rate.) Statistically signiﬁ  cant results in 
Table 3 suggest that, in this event, banks prefer to 
pledge GoC bonds relative to GoC-guaranteed 
securities. This result is less intuitive and could be 
biased, since the quantity of high-quality pledged 
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environment where the use of collateral has expanded 
and where certain securities are thought to be scarce. 
The empirical analysis presented in this article pro-
vides an extensive list of factors that affect the choice 
of collateral in wholesale markets. While many of the 
factors affecting the demand for collateral were already 
well known (e.g., the dynamics of payment ﬂ  ow, 
balance-sheet factors, and market interest rates), this 
analysis presents new evidence on how market 
liquidity and trading in ﬁ  xed-income markets can 
affect the choice of collateral. 
The results ﬁ  nd strong evidence to suggest that 
relative market liquidity and market-making capacity 
are important factors in the choice of securities 
pledged as collateral in the LVTS. Since market-
making activities can be a proﬁ  table business line, it 
is expected that FIs will ﬁ  rst look for assets held in 
their inventories that are not required immediately for 
other purposes; that is, assets that are relatively less 
active or liquid.
20 Furthermore, FIs will look to the 
inventories of assets in which they have more man-
agement expertise. Their knowledge of the inventory 
risk associated with these securities can minimize 
their temporary funding costs in the long run.
The results ﬁ  nd strong evidence to 
suggest that relative market liquidity and 
market-making capacity are important 
factors in the choice of securities 
pledged as collateral in the LVTS.
There is an implicit opportunity cost associated with 
holding securities that are eligible as collateral in 
wholesale ﬁ  nancial markets. In particular, certain 
assets that serve as collateral in the LVTS can also 
be redeployed to other proﬁ  table uses. These assets 
(e.g., liquid Government of Canada bonds and bills) 
are highly sought after and have been used less 
extensively in the LVTS since the list of eligible secur-
ities was expanded. Such securities are still pledged 
for short-term needs, however. In contrast, less-liquid 
inventories of securities that have a higher yield and 
that an FI has a comparative advantage in managing 
are more cost-effective when pledged as collateral. 
20  Liquid and/or redeployable collateral is valuable in FIs with many business lines that 
may require temporary funding. The literature on benchmark, or on-the-run, securities 
suggests that assets with similar cash ﬂ  ows can differ substantially in their liquidity 
and price.
The control variables from the duration analysis are 
consistent with the conditional unordered logit esti-
mates. For example, an increase in the value of 
payments sent reduces the length of time before a 
security is released from the LVTS, suggesting that 
the variables for payments sent may be more related 
to short-term needs for collateral. In contrast, when 
realized volatility is elevated over the previous month, 
all securities are kept in the LVTS for longer periods 
before being released.
Summary and Conclusions
It is important to monitor how participants in the LVTS 
make use of the assets available to them in their 










































































































Observations 1188 857 6922 1068 1154
Log likelihood -2019.4 -1377.3 -8458.2 -1755.8 -1929.9
LR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a.  Estimates of coefﬁ  cients are based on the estimation of an accelerated failure-time 
model (see equation 1) for each asset class. The error term is assumed to follow a 
Weibull distribution. The sample period is 28 March 2002 to 30 March 2007. The 
dependent variable, In(tj), is the log of the number of days that a security is pledged 
as collateral. Probability values are presented in parentheses. Independent variables 
include dummy variables for GoC treasury bills, GoC-guaranteed securities, provin-
cial/municipal securities, and private sector securities. These dummy variables are 
also multiplied by the value of the payments sent on the day of the pledge, payment 
volatility equal to standard deviation of payments sent over the past 20 business days, 
the ratio of liquid to total assets in the most recent quarter, the ratio of capital to 
risk-weighted assets in the most recent quarter, and the spread between the CORRA 
and the Bank of Canada’s target overnight rate. The following are also included as 
explanatory variables: market liquidity, calculated by dividing the volume of securities 
traded over the most recent quarter by the average amount of securities outstanding 
in that quarter; and market-making, the fraction of trading in each asset class by 
each FI.
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Empirical Methodology
In McFadden’s (1974) choice model, there is a set 
of unordered choices, say, 1,2,...., . Let   be an 
indicator variable for the actual choice of collateral 
made by a ﬁ  nancial institution (FI). In particular, 
 if the institution chooses asset   on day  , 
and   for  . The independent variables in 
the model,  , can be broken down into 
attributes of the choices on day  ,  , and individual 
characteristics of the ﬁ  rm on day  ,  .
1
Unordered-choice models are motivated by a 
random-utility model. FIs maximize utility (account-
ing for both proﬁ  ts and the risk management of 
assets across its balance sheet). For a ﬁ  rm faced 
with   choices, the utility of choice   on day   is
  .
If the bank makes choice  , it is assumed that   is 
the maximum among the   utilities. The statistical 
model is driven by the probability that choice   is 
made, which is
 
for all other  . If, and only if, the   disturbances 





1  A multinomial logit model can be utilized when only individual attributes are 
observed.
The conditional logit model is intended for prob-
lems where choices are made based at least partly 
on observable attributes of each alternative. For 
the current model to allow for individual speciﬁ  c 
effects, dummy variables for the choices have to 
be created. These are then multiplied by the  ’s. 
In this way, the coefﬁ  cients can vary across the 
choices instead of the characteristics, and not drop 
out of the probabilities. Estimation of the model by 
maximum likelihood methods is straightforward, 
where the dependent variable is coded as either 0 
or 1. The log-likelihood function is
  ,
where   is one when alternative   is chosen at time 
 and zero otherwise. The model is slightly different 
from a regular logistic regression in that the data 
are grouped and the likelihood is calculated relative 
to all other possible choices that the institution 
could have made.
2 In a model that is estimated for 
multiple FIs, the above equations are replicated for 
each FI and the log-likelihood function includes an 
additional summation across the FIs.
2  Conditional and multinominal logit models are convenient but assume independ-
ence from irrelevant alternatives. Speciﬁ  cally, a third alternative does not affect the 
relative odds between alternatives   and  .